Abstract: This paper develops a game-theoretic model based on a two-sided market framework to compare Internet service providers' (ISPs) investment incentives, content providers' (CPs) participation, and social welfare between neutral and non-neutral network regimes. We find that ISPs' investments are driven by the trade-off between softening consumer price competition and increasing revenues from CPs. Specifically, investments are higher in the non-neutral regime because it is easier to extract revenue through appropriate CP pricing. On the other hand, participation of CPs may be reduced in a non-neutral network due to higher prices. The net impact of non-neutrality on social welfare is determined by which of these two effects is dominant. Overall, we find that the non-neutral network is always welfare superior in a "walled-gardens" model, while the neutral network is superior in a "priority lanes" model when CP-quality heterogeneity is large. These results provide useful insights that inform the net-neutrality debate.
Introduction
Since 2005, when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) changed the classification of Internet transmissions from "telecommunication services" to "information services," Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are no longer bound by the non-discrimination policies in place for the telecommunications industry (Federal Communications Commission 2005) . This has led to the so-called net neutrality debate. While there is no standard definition of what a net neutral policy is, it is widely viewed as a policy that mandates ISPs to provide openaccess, preventing them from any form of discrimination against Content Providers (CPs). In particular, in a neutral Internet, ISPs are not allowed to offer enhanced differentiated services to CPs and to charge a premium for a priority lane for certain content. In addition, in a neutral Internet, ISPs are not allowed to charge access fees to deliver the content to residential consumers from CPs that are not directly connected to them.
Net neutrality has been a widely and hotly debated issue by law and policymakers. On one side of the debate, CPs argue that departing from net neutrality will allow a pricing flexibility for ISPs that will threaten content innovation. In particular, priority lanes may make it hard for nascent CPs to compete head-tohead against established ones. Moreover, allowing ISPs to charge access fees will give providers monopoly power over the access to their consumer base increasing prices. In short, access fees and price discrimination would deter entry, reduce CP surplus and CPs' innovation incentives, especially affecting nascent CPs. The other side of the debate is advanced by ISPs who argue that net neutrality regulation would hinder their ability to recoup investment costs on their broadband networks, essentially taking away the economic incentives to upgrade their infrastructure. 1 The above debate has mostly been of a qualitative nature (see, e.g., Farrell and Weiser 2003; Wu 2003; Nuechterlein and Weiser 2005; Hahn and Wallsten 2006; Sidak 2006; Yoo 2006; Lee and Wu 2009; Odlyzko 2009 ); with much less formal economic research to inform it (we provide relevant references in the next section). This paper adds to the growing body of formal economic analysis that will help inform policy makers on the net neutrality debate and sheds light on the validity, or lack thereof, of the arguments proposed by the different advocacy groups involved. In particular, this article develops a game theoretic model based on a two-sided market framework (for an introduction to two-sided markets, we refer the reader to Rochet and Tirole 2006) to investigate the effects of a net neutrality mandate on investment incentives of ISPs, and its concomitant effects on social welfare, consumer and CP surplus, and CP market participation. Our work complements, and in some cases challenges current literature on net neutrality, providing useful insights for this policy debate.
1 This argument is perhaps best exemplified by the former CEO of AT&T, Ed Whitacre, who said in an interview that "Now what [CPs] would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain't going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there's going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion they're using" (Business Week 2005).
Our model consists of two interconnected ISPs (or platforms) represented as profit maximizing firms that choose quality investment levels and then compete in prices for both CPs and consumers. There is a mass of CPs that are heterogeneous in content quality, and a mass of consumers that have different valuations over content. Platforms provide connection services to consumers and CPs and charge a flat access fee to both. A CP makes revenue from advertising, which is increasing with the mass of consumers that access it, as well as with the quality of its content that is enhanced by the quality of the connections between the CP and consumers. Based on this, CPs make connection decisions; the mass of CPs that decide to participate in the market serves as a proxy for CP innovation in our model. Consumers gain value from the content provided by CPs. A consumer's utility is increasing in the mass of CPs it has access to, the quality of these CPs, and the quality of the connection between the consumer and the CPs. The investment decision made by an ISP drives the quality-of-service (QoS) offered by that ISP which determines its market share in the CP and consumer markets. In particular, the investment decisions affect consumer and CP welfare since consumer utility depends on the quality of transmission (determined by the worse quality of the platforms modeling a bottleneck effect) and CP utility depends on ad prices which is a function of the quality of transmission.
We model the interaction between ISPs, CPs and consumers as a six-stage game that incorporates the different time-scales at which decisions are made. The timing is given by platforms' investment decisions (stage 1), CP competition (stages 2-3), and consumer competition (stages 4-6). Competition at each side of the market corresponds to a pricing game with vertical differentiation followed by a choice of platform for the agents on that side. Technically, these games are challenging to solve because of the many stages and the heterogeneity among the participants. However, notably, we are able to explicitly solve for the subgame perfect equilibria of these games using backward induction. In Section 3 we discuss and justify our assumptions and provide real-world examples that we believe fit well with our model.
Our analysis involves a neutral and a non-neutral model. In the neutral model, a CP pays only once to access the Internet, and through its ISP it can communicate with consumers subscribed to either platform. Moreover, an ISP provides the same quality to all CPs regardless of whether the CP is directly connected and paying fees to it or not. Instead, in the non-neutral model, ISPs charge fees to discriminate among CPs. We consider two different models to represent a non-neutral network. In the first, we assume an ISP offers a basic quality of service, y basic > 0, to off-network CPs, but an enhanced quality of service to CPs that directly connect to the ISP. In that sense, the non-neutral regime allows ISPs to offer a priority lane to CPs that pay fees. We refer to this model as the priority-lane model. In the second model, the basic quality y basic is set to 0. This represents a non-neutral network in which ISPs effectively charge access fees to off-network CPs to deliver their content. We refer to this model as the walled-garden model. While the first definition of a non-neutral regime is more aligned with the current policy debate, similar definitions to the second one have been proposed and studied by leading academicians in the area [e.g., Lee and Wu (2009) and Economides and Tåg (2012) ].
2 Under the second definition, in the non-neutral regime, each platform has a monopoly over the access to its consumer base. 3 Our presentation is divided in two parts. First, we provide a complete theoretical analysis and closed-form analytical results for the walled-garden model. In the second part of the paper, we study the priority-lane model. The prioritylane model is effectively a two-tiered service, which is less discriminatory than the walled-garden model and more closely represents the notion of a non-neutral network used by policymakers. However, explicitly incorporating the two tiers makes the model analytically intractable. For this reason, we provide exhaustive numerical simulations and find that some of the main insights are consistent with the theoretical results obtained in the walled-garden case. We also obtain new insights that enrich our discussion, as we describe below. In addition, numerical studies provide us with the flexibility to investigate the robustness of our findings to various assumptions made in our theoretical analysis for tractability.
For the theoretical model we provide an explicit characterization of equilibrium investment levels, prices and market coverage levels under both the neutral and non-neutral regimes. In the numerical models we provide simulation results for the same values over an extensive parameter range. We show how the models' outcomes depend on the selection of parameters and, in particular, on the level of heterogeneity of CP quality (as measured by a quantity related to its coefficient of variation).
An important insight that arises from this work is that the investment patterns of platforms are driven by trade-offs between softening price competition on the consumer side and increasing profits on the CP side. The extent of this trade-off depends on whether the network is neutral or not. The next two bullet points provide details for each regime.
-In the neutral model the platforms are viewed as substitutes by both CPs and consumers. Hence at equilibrium, platforms maximally differentiate to corner different consumer and CP niches in the market. More precisely, one platform opts to invest the least-possible quality level, while the other picks the highest quality permitted by investment costs. In the sequel, we refer to the platform that invest the least, resp. the most, as the low-quality, resp. high-quality, platform. Essentially, the low-quality platform trades-off making revenue on the CP side to making revenue on the consumer side. Investing does not pay off because it would increase price competition on the consumer side, thus reducing revenues extracted from consumers; this effect dominates the additional revenues that could be captured from CPs. In contrast, the investment made by the high-quality platform allows it to differentiate from the low-quality platform and to earn significant revenue from CPs as well as consumers.
4
-Under both definitions of the non-neutral model platforms are viewed as substitutes only by consumers. In contrast, from the CPs' perspective, each platform has a monopoly over the access to its consumer base in as far as CPs would like to push high-quality enhanced content. Consequently, CPs decide whether to connect to each platform independently, causing different platforms' investment patterns from those in the neutral regime. In most instances of this model, platforms only differentiate partially. In particular, both platforms make positive investments leading to more investment in platform quality than in the neutral regime. In fact, in the non-neutral model, platforms can recoup their investments more easily through appropriate CP pricing. Consequently, the low-quality platform invests to increase revenues extracted from CPs by increasing prices; this effect is more important than softening price competition on the consumer side.
The main results regarding the welfare effects of neutrality are driven by the trade-offs above. In particular, in the non-neutral regime platforms invest more;
this has a positive effect on gross consumer and CP surplus, 5 and on overall social welfare. On the other hand, due to their monopoly power over access, platforms have the ability to charge higher prices to CPs relative to the neutral regime. To the extent that these higher prices reduce CP participation, this can have a negative effect on CP and consumer gross surplus, as well as on overall social welfare. The net impact of a non-neutral network is determined by which of these two effects is dominant.
We find that for all the models we study (both with y basic = 0 and y basic > 0) when CP heterogeneity is low, the positive effect of increased investment on the nonneutral network is dominant and therefore social welfare is larger compared to the neutral regime. More specifically, larger investment has two major effects on consumers. First, it increases price competition between platforms leading to lower connection prices. Second, it results in enhanced platform quality which translates into additional utility for consumers. In addition, CP profits (surplus) are larger in the non-neutral regime, because the increase in advertisement revenues due to larger investments more than compensates for the larger prices charged by the platforms. Moreover, participation of CPs, our proxy for CP innovation, is not reduced in the non-neutral regime. Low-quality platform profits are larger in the non-neutral regime because it earns revenue from both sides of the market. On the other hand, the high quality platform profits are larger in the neutral regime, in which there is maximal differentiation in platform quality; in the non-neutral regime, the low-quality platform erodes its profits by reducing differentiation.
The insights above continue to hold in the theoretical model where y basic = 0 even for high CP heterogeneity. However, the results change when y basic > 0. More specifically, as CP heterogeneity increases, CP demand becomes more inelastic. This, together with the monopoly over access that platforms enjoy in the nonneutral regime, introduces an upward pressure on prices charged to CPs. The platform's ability to exploit its monopoly power and price discriminate is larger in the model with y basic > 0 relative to the case y basic = 0, because in the former case they target the high-end CPs as the low-end CPs have a viable outside option given by the basic quality connection. Our numerical experiments illustrate that this has several consequences when y basic > 0 and CP heterogeneity is large: (1) CP market coverage is smaller in the non-neutral regime compared to the neutral regime; 6 (2) CPs' profits are smaller in the non-neutral regime; (3) consumer surplus is smaller 5 Gross surplus is defined as the total utility earned by a player before subtracting the price it pays to the platform. 6 Market coverage in the non-neutral regime refers to the size of the CP market buying enhanced quality.
in the non-neutral regime; and (4) the high-quality platform obtains larger profits in the non-neutral regime. These results, basically driven by large CP prices and the reduced CP participation in the non-neutral regime, imply that overall social welfare is larger in the neutral regime. This case is more aligned with the publiclyheld opinion of net neutrality advocates that a non-neutral network may reduce CP participation and, therefore, may reduce innovation and welfare.
Our results suggest that investment incentives of ISPs, which are important drivers for innovation and deployment of new technologies, play a key role in the net neutrality debate. In the non-neutral regime, because it is easier to extract surplus through appropriate CP pricing, our model predicts that ISPs' investment levels are higher; this coincides with the predictions made by the defendants of the non-neutral regime. On the other hand, because of platforms' monopoly power over access, CP participation can be reduced in the non-neutral regime; this coincides with the predictions made by the defendants of the neutral regime. We find that in the walled-garden model, the first effect is dominant and social welfare is always larger in the non-neutral model. While this still holds for many instances of the priority-lane model, the neutral regime is welfare superior relative to the non-neutral regime when CP heterogeneity is large. In summary, a key determinant of the welfare properties of a non-neutral network are driven by the extent to which platforms can exploit their monopoly power over access and therefore reduce CP participation; in our model this is critically driven by the form of non-neutrality and the level of CP heterogeneity. We believe these results provide useful insights that can help policymakers make more informed decisions in this important policy debate.
To conclude, we highlight that our model abstracts away many features of the topology of Internet. We do so mainly for tractability reasons. The real structure of the Internet is more complex and contains more entities grouped in intricate ways. [For an overview of the business structure, interconnections, agreements and contracts, we refer the reader to Crowcroft (2007) and Yoo (2010) .]
Structure of the Paper: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We relate our work to the relevant literature in Section 2. Sections 3-5 discuss our theoretical model in which y basic = 0 (the walled-garden model). In particular, Section 3 presents the game that models the neutral regime. In Section 4, we modify the game to model the non-neutral regime. Section 5 compares the resulting welfare in each regime. In Section 6, we provide the numerical studies that extend the theoretical model in various directions, including the priority-lanes model. We conclude in Section 7 by summarizing our results and providing insights for policymakers. Due to space limitations all mathematical proofs have been relegated to the separate online appendix.
Related Literature
On a broad scope, our work complements and contributes to previous research in the literature of Industrial Organization by explicitly considering quality investment in the context of two-sided markets. In particular, our model embeds price competition and quality choice in vertically differentiated markets (like in Shaked and Sutton 1982) in a two-sided market (like in Rochet and Tirole 2003; Gabszewicz and Wauthy 2004; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Roson 2005; Armstrong 2006 ).
Regarding the literature on net neutrality, as previously mentioned, most of it has been qualitative; mostly from the law and policy sphere. Supplementing these papers are those that focus more on the technical aspects, as opposed to the economics, of the debate, e.g., Crowcroft (2007) . Recently, several publications have formalized some of the issues around net neutrality with economic and mathematical models. Our paper contributes to this literature as we now describe.
The model we introduce includes two key aspects on the economic analysis of the net neutrality debate that distinguishes it from several paper in in this area. First, we consider ISP competition. We believe this is a key feature of our model, because one common argument in the policy arena around the net neutrality debate is that competition may by itself take care of the potentially negative effects that a discriminatory network can have on social welfare. Indeed, in our paper a non-neutral network can increase not only overall social welfare, but also consumer surplus, and CP surplus when CP heterogeneity is low. Competition in quality and prices among the ISPs is a critical driver of these results. Moreover, our model predicts that in some cases an ISP may be better off under a neutral network, again because of competition between ISPs in the non-neutral regime. Papers that consider a monopolistic ISP cannot capture these effects. Other important papers that have considered competition among ISPs are Hermalin and Katz (2007) , Musacchio et al. (2009 ), Choi et al. (2011 , Economides and Tåg (2012) , and Bourreau et al. (2012) . We start by comparing our model and results to Bourreau et al. (2012) because their work is most related to ours. Immediately after, we provide more details about the other references above and some others that consider monopolistic ISPs.
The model by Bourreau et al. (2012) and their results share many similarities with ours. In particular, like us, their model includes ISP competition and investments (in capacity), CPs and consumer heterogeneity, and CPs endogenous participation decisions as a proxy for content innovation. They work with priority lanes, similarly to our case of y basic > 0. However, the specific modeling assumptions they make do not always coincide with ours, which implies that some of the particular mechanisms through which results follow are different between both papers. Specifically, the modeling differences are that (i) congestion is captured by an M/M/1 queue in which investment increases service rate and ad revenues (while we consider a simpler model of CP-side congestion), (ii) they consider horizontal differentiation in the consumer market (while we consider vertical differentiation), and (iii) ISPs only charge consumers and not CPs in the neutral model (while we consider that ISPs price at both sides of the market). Their main result has a similar flavor to ours: under their assumptions, a non-neutral network always increases social welfare because ISPs' quality investments are larger. For our modeling assumptions, which we justify in the next section, we find conditions under which each regime can be superior to the other. The difference with Bourreau et al. (2012) 's result occurs when CPs are highly heterogeneous in which case we show that the neutral regime may be welfare superior, as it was already discussed in the introduction. Overall, our conclusion for the heterogenous case seems to be well aligned with the publicly-held opinion that discrimination and priorities may decrease CP innovation and welfare. We believe that these two papers are useful complements that provide some sense of robustness to the conclusion that a non-neutral network could increase social welfare through larger ISP investments by allowing different modeling assumptions.
In the rest of this section we discuss in more detail other papers that have studied the network neutrality debate from an economic perspective. Conceptually, it is useful to classify the literature into two broad classes categorized by the adopted working definition of net neutrality. One group adopts the view that a non-neutral Internet allows ISPs to create walled gardens, as we do when y basic = 0, while the other group allows ISPs to create priority lanes, as we do when y basic > 0. [See Schuett (2010) for a recent literature review.]
In the group that considers walled gardens, the work of Musacchio et al. (2009 ) is related to our theoretical model. However, they consider prices only for consumers in the neutral regime and a two-sided market that incorporates prices at both sides in the non-neutral one. Also, this paper does not consider CP and consumer heterogeneity nor price competition for consumers. Investment increases the value of content and therefore increases the click-through rate for CPs, while it has no effect in the consumer side. According to this model, social welfare (or also CPs and ISPs) can be higher in either regime and the preference depends on the ratio between ad rates and consumer price sensitivity. Economides and Tåg (2012) consider a two-sided market framework to investigate the effect of net neutrality regulation (defined as setting zero access fee to CPs) in both a monopoly and duopoly setting. Results are ambiguous in the monopoly case, but often neutrality increases social welfare in duopoly. However, their model does not include investment decisions of platforms, a key driver of our results. Cañon (2009) investigates the effect of net neutrality under various pricing regulations in the presence of investment decisions. He finds that the neutral regime is superior in terms of total welfare. Unlike our setup, though, his model considers only a single monopolistic ISP, instead of looking at competitive platforms as we do. In this work, investment improves consumers experience of consuming content and reduces CP's delivery costs (there is no congestion in this model). Gupta et al. (2011) analyze investment incentives of network providers under both congestion-based and flat pricing. Their results show that social benefits are generally higher in congestion-based pricing, illustrating the critical impact pricing structures have on network providers' investment incentives.
In the group that adopts priority lanes, Hermalin and Katz (2007) consider ISPs that offer different qualities to heterogeneous CPs in a setting with homogenous consumers. The main result is that discrimination may decrease welfare in a monopolistic and duopolistic setting. Choi et al. (2011) and Economides and Hermalin (2012) are also related to this stream of literature. While the former paper is concerned on interconnection decisions among platforms, the latter focuses on end users' consumption decisions under a monopolistic ISP. Choi et al. (2011) compares both regimes after computing prices that ISPs charge to CPs and interconnection fees they charge to the other ISP. This paper does not directly consider investment choices. On its part, Economides and Hermalin (2012) consider a monopoly model and find that the ability to price discriminate in a non-neutral network increases the ISP investment incentives, and may increase overall welfare under some conditions. Investment increases capacity and plays an indirect effect on CPs' profits through content pricing to consumers. Cheng et al. (2011) and Choi and Kim (2010) are similar in that they consider a monopolistic ISP with two CPs and a continuum of consumers who only access one CP. They consider priority lanes, explicitly model congestion using an M/M/1 queue, but they differ on their treatment of priorities. Investment increases capacity that in turn decreases congestion. The main difference between both papers is that the former allows both CPs to select a priority contract whereas the latter only allows the ISP to prioritize one of them. Compared to these models, our model is richer in that it considers ISP competition, a continuum of heterogeneous CPs with endogenous participation decisions, and that consumers can connect to several CPs simultaneously. On the other hand, while our model considers different qualities of service, we do not model consumer-side congestion. Cheng et al. (2011) find that ISPs invest at the socially-optimal level under the neutral regime but either under-or overinvests under the non-neutral regime. Investment effects are experienced through consumer demand for services. We note that our results are in marked contrast with that conclusion; our model, which features competition among ISPs, supports that in most cases ISPs invest more under a non-neutral regime. Choi and Kim (2010) extend the previous analysis and address investments incentives of the (single) ISP, as well as those of CPs. Choi and Kim (2010) also find instances in which a non-neutral network induces smaller levels of investments. We believe that a modeling difference with our paper that partially drives this result is that in that paper capacity is shared by the CPs through a priority scheme. Hence, larger capacities may imply a smaller relative value of prioritization. Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012) is similar to the two papers mentioned in the paragraph above. They study a monopolistic setting, but considers a continuum of CPs and consumers that can connect to multiple CPs as we do. This paper assumes that investment increases capacity, which affects the click-through rate of CPs and hence also their profits. Under specific assumptions on priority pricing, they find that a non-neutral network with discrimination increases ISP investments and overall welfare.
In summary, as far as we know, our paper provided the first analysis of the net neutrality debate in a model that simultaneously considers: (1) competition between ISPs; (2) ISPs investment decisions; (3) CPs and consumers' heterogeneity; and (4) CPs' endogenous participation decisions as a proxy for content innovation. All of these elements play a key role in the trade-offs that our model identifies. Moreover, we believe they are relevant and realistic features of the Internet. We conclude by noting that to build towards the results presented here, in Njoroge et al. (2009) , we have presented a preliminary version of the neutral model. Then, in Njoroge et al. (2010) , we have provided a first version of the theoretical results presented here. Since then, a number of papers incorporating some of the features we consider in our model have appeared, importantly the model by Bourreau et al. (2012) mentioned earlier.
The Neutral Model
We consider two platforms (or ISPs) denoted by α and β, and a continuum of consumers with a mass of f∈ [0, 1] , and of CPs with a unit mass. Let z y + ∈R be the quality-of-service (QoS) chosen by platform z∈{α, β}. We assume that y α ≥ y β ≥ y basic , and hence, we refer to α as the high-quality platform and to β as the low-quality one. The quality level y basic is a minimum threshold that ISPs are enforced to provide to all CPs by regulation. In practice, this would correspond to a basic connectivity requirement. The case of y basic = 0 corresponds to offering no service to CPs that are not connected directly; that is, this corresponds to the walled-garden case. Instead, when y basic > 0, there are two classes of service corresponding to having priority lanes. Our theoretical model of Sections 3-5 assumes the former (y basic = 0) but we extend the analysis to the latter through numerical simulations in Section 6.
Let γ j be the quality of CP j where j∈ [0, 1] . Here, γ j is a uniformly distributed random variable with support [ , ] a a γ γ − + and 0 . a γ < < We assume that the γ j 's are independent and identically distributed across the population of CPs. The heterogeneity of CPs will play a key role in determining the welfare effects of a non-neutral regime; we will capture it with the quantity / , a γ which can be thought as a proxy of the coefficient of variation of the CP quality. By definition, this ratio is strictly between 0 and 1.
Let φ:
be the connection decisions that map the space of consumers and CPs, respectively, to the set of platforms. (Note that φ may be a correspondence in the non-neutral regime since a CP may multihome.) Aggregating those mappings, we denote by r α and r β (q α and q β ) the masses of CPs (consumers) that join each platform. Besides choosing their QoS as we will discuss below, platforms offer additional services to their own consumer base that improve the quality of content generated by CPs. Examples of such additional services are email accounts, virus scanning, blocking of malicious sites, and spam filtering. We denote the values of these services by k α and k β , defined as random variables with the same distributions as those of γ j .
We now introduce the utilities of the three types of participants in this multistage game.
Consumer Utility:
A consumer i on a platform φ(i) connecting to a CP j on platform ˆ( ) j φ receives utility
The formula multiplies the quality of the network transmission, given by the worst of the two platforms, by the value of the content plus the additional services offered by the platform. To compute the value of the content, we divide the quality of CP j by the mass of CPs that connect to the same platform to incorporate congestion effects: more CPs in a platform generate more congestion, reducing value. The value generated by both the CP and platform content is affected by the QoS of the transmission. This implies that a consumer on a high-quality platform, connecting to a CP on the same platform, receives higher utility than if he connects to a CP of the same quality on the low-quality platform. In essence, consumer utility depends on the platform that acts as a bottleneck, capturing common congestion effects present in the Internet (Akamai Technologies 2000).
The second factor of the consumer utility (1) captures content value. Its form deserves further discussion. Congestion is treated asymmetrically as we do not consider congestion on the consumer side. Evidently, this is a simplification; however, introducing congestion on the side of consumers leads to an intractable congestion game, considering that our model features competition among ISPs with heterogeneous consumers and heterogeneous CPs. In Section 6, as a robustness check, we study how eliminating congestion altogether changes the insights derived from the theoretical model and conclude that the asymmetric treatment of congestion is not a primary driver of our main results. Recall that in the literature review (Section 2) we described the differences between our model and models that explicitly consider consumer-side congestion. We note that introducing congestion on the CP side aids with analytical tractability. Similarly, although the values k φ(i) of the additional services offered by ISPs may be unrealistically too large (since they are drawn from the same distribution as CPs), we include them in (1) for analytical tractability. In Section 6, we also eliminate them and show that our main qualitative insights do not change without these terms.
Each consumer connects to a single platform but once connected has access to all content due to the interconnection of the platforms in the neutral model. In particular, a consumer i on platform φ(i) connects to all CPs subscribed to either platform since u ij ≥ 0 for all j. We let the overall utility perceived by consumer i that joins platform φ(i) be
.
The arguments that we make explicit in this utility function, and in those appearing later, are those that are pertinent to the current stage of the game. Here, φ(-i) denotes the other platform, and the expectation is taken over the random parameters such as γ j and k φ(i) . Platform z∈{α, β} charges consumers a connection fee of p z . Consumers have a reservation utility of R and consumers preferences are heterogeneous, which we represent with the parameter θ i that is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, f ]. The total mass of consumers is f. Putting it all together, the utility of a consumer i connecting to platform φ(i) is given by
Consumers join the platform that yield the highest utility, provided it is positive.
CP Profits:
If CPs connect to a platform z∈{α, β}, they pay a fixed connection fee w z and make revenue by selling advertising and showing it to consumers. The utility v j of a CP j is defined to be its profit: ˆ( ) ( , , , , ) ,
where the first term is its gross revenue, given by(
is a function that represents ad prices. It is increasing in both parameters: Ad prices are high when content quality is good because it is easier to attract advertisers. In addition, consumers have a better experience with high-quality platforms and, therefore, they spend more time in these sites which increases the advertisers brand exposure. Thus advertisers are willing to pay more. Note that if CP j joins the higher quality platform, it is able to charge a higher ad price for connections arising from consumers on that platform. If a CP joins the lower quality platform its ad prices are the same across the two platforms because when a customer and CP connect to different platforms, the QoS is given by the worst of them.
Platform Payoffs: Finally we consider the platform payoff functions. Platforms pay for their quality investment, which is modeled with an increasing and convex investment cost I(y z ) to achieve a QoS of y z . This assumption results in decreasing returns to investment. Two additional, but standard, assumptions that we make for tractability are that the investment function is differentiable and that I(0) = 0. The payoff π z experienced by platform z is given by ( ).
Regarding some of the assumptions of our model, we note that a critical aspect of our work is understanding the impact of quality investments in market outcomes. For this, we believe it is important to consider a model with a vertical dimension of differentiation, in which an ISP with higher quality is perceived by all consumers and ISPs to be superior. Here, we follow classic papers in the industrial organization literature that model quality competition with subsequent price competition, similarly to our model, considering vertical differentiation (Jaskold Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979; Shaked and Sutton 1982) . Furthermore, Connolly and Prieger (2013) empirically show that there is significant simultaneous entry and exit in the US broadband market. This suggests that ISPs are heterogeneous as they have very different reactions under similar economic conditions. A model of vertical differentiation in which successful high-quality firms co-exist with low-quality firms that enter and exit the market is consistent with these findings.
Although several papers in the network neutrality literature use models of horizontal differentiation (see Section 2), for the reasons explained above, we decided to focus on the vertical dimension instead. In that sense, we believe our model provides a useful complement to the papers with models of horizontal differentiation. Oligopoly models that are rich enough to take to data often incorporate both vertical and horizontal differentiation (e.g., Berry et al. 1995 ). An interesting extension to our model could be to add an horizontal dimension of differentiation on top of the vertical dimension. However, this makes the analysis of the model even more challenging.
Timing: With all the elements already in place, the sequential game we study consists of the following stages: 1. Quality Investment Decisions: Platforms simultaneously choose QoS y α and y β . 2. CP Pricing Decisions: Platforms simultaneously choose fees w α and w β . 3. CP Connection Decisions: CPs decide which platform to join. 4. Consumer Pricing Decisions: Platforms simultaneously choose prices p α and p β . 5. Consumer Connection Decisions: Consumers decide which platform to join. 6. Consumer Consumption Decisions: Consumers decide which CPs to get service from.
Note that in our model a duopoly of ISPs serve both sides of the market. We justify this setting with a motivating example in the section below. Before, we justify the order of moves in this context. First, the longest term decision is the strategic position adopted by ISPs, which is represented by the investment levels they choose. Then, CP prices and CP connection decisions are done before consumers' decisions. The main reason behind it is that in the settings we have in mind contracting decisions between CPs and ISPs are usually longer-term than those between consumers and ISPs. Indeed, we highlight that CPs are frequently hosted from within ISPs. This is sometimes achieved by physically placing servers in the local network of ISPs to improve the access latency to end-users, elevating the switch cost if a CP were to switch to a different ISP. On the other hand, end-users can more easily switch to another ISP; in fact, ISPs are very aggressive promoting their services to get new customers from other ISPs. At both stages, it is reasonable that pricing comes before making the decision of who to connect to.
We solve this game by considering its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE), focusing on optimal actions/decisions along the equilibrium paths. To solve the game we use backward induction.
To conclude the presentation of our model, Figure 1 shows an illustration of the full model, summarizing all players, elements and parameters.
Motivating Example
To connect our assumptions to a real-world setting, in this section we draw a parallel between our model and the market for Internet service in Chile. This discussion can also serve as a starting point to connect our model to the situation of other countries as well.
Consumers of mass f < 1 indexed by i 0 f
CPs of mass 1 indexed by j 0 1 Although the Internet is a complex ecosystem of companies, the assumption of having a duopoly of ISPs serving both content providers (CPs) and end users (EUs) is aligned with the predominant situation in many places in the world. This is especially the case outside large cities in developed countries or in smaller countries that cannot support many providers because of the market size. The Internet market in Chile is an example of what is essentially a duopoly. Quoting from an article by PwC, "Fixed Internet connections (residential and commercial) are dominated by two companies, Movistar (Telefonica) and VTR. They share 81% of the market, Movistar having 43% and VTR 38%. Groupo GTD and Claro Comunicaciones S.A. have 8% and 7%, respectively. The remaining share of the market is distributed among small companies that offer dedicated Internet services to small and medium-sized firms, universities, schools, etc. Chile has one the highest Internet penetration rates in Latin America …" (Ruano and Mahorney 2011: p. 25) . Therefore, as we assumed in our model, Chile is a country where Internet has big penetration and is operated predominantly by a duopoly of ISPs that serve both sides of the market, that is, end-users and CPs. Also, the fact that ISPs serve both sides of the market, and in particular CPs, is consistent with the discussion above regarding the timing of the game in which CPs are hosted from within ISPs.
We also note that both ISPs in Chile offer value-added services such as antivirus software, Wi-Fi service, parental control, cloud access and storage, access to digital music, and video content, etc. This provides support to our assumption in our basic model that ISPs offer additional services that represent a factor in the utility function of consumers, besides connection speed and quality.
To conclude, let us also mention that Chile was the first country in the world to enact Net neutrality regulations. They were approved in August 2010. Quoting from the PwC report cited earlier, the net neutrality regulation advocates "no restrictions on content by ISPs or the government and no speed limitations. Its main goal is to guarantee rights to Internet users and free competition." [p. 26] . In any case, the debate of how net neutrality should be regulated is far from settled in Chile or in the world, and it is unclear how Internet penetration, investments by different firms and consumer welfare would have changed if a different regulation or none had been established in Chile.
Analysis of the Neutral Model
denote the set of players in the multi-stage game, where α and β are the platforms, and [0, 1] j and [0, f ] i are the continuum of CPs and consumers, respectively. We denote the information set at stage k of the game for a player ρ∈P by . k h ρ Let the set of actions available to that player at that stage with that information set be denoted as ( ).
The main challenge to solve for an SPE in our model consists in solving the first three stages of the game. The analysis of the later stages of the game are more standard. Consumer prices at equilibrium follow from a standard vertical differentiation model (Tirole 1988) . This analysis leaves us with a number of possible market configurations that could arise. To solve for the second stage, we first identify candidate Nash equilibrium CP price pairs for each of the market configurations. Then we show that these pairs are also best responses on the whole domain of strategies; i.e., a candidate price pair not only consists of prices that are mutual best responses in a particular market configuration but across all market configurations. To solve for the first stage of the game, we identify sets that contain the best responses and find their intersection points. These give us the candidate investment pairs. We then show that these pairs are indeed SPE by showing that neither of the platforms has an incentive to deviate. In the next subsections, we provide a more detailed analysis of each stage of the game.
Consumer Consumption Decisions
As usual with games of this kind, we begin the analysis with the last stage of the game where consumers select CPs with whom they will connect. A consumer i on a platform φ(i) ∈{α, β} accessing content of a CP j on platform ˆ( ) { , } j φ α β ∈ receives utility u ij represented in (1). As we discussed earlier, since u ij ≥ 0 for all consumer-CP pairs, when a consumer joins a platform he will connect to all CPs hosted by either platform. For simplicity, we assume in the neutral model that consumer i joins CP j even if u ij = 0; of course, this will have no effect in its overall utility.
Consumer Connection Decisions
In this stage of the game consumers decide which platform to join. The choice set of a consumer i∈ [0, f ] 
Through his information set, a consumer has knowledge of the number of CPs on each platform, the prices that platforms charge and the quality level of each platform. Each consumer i maximizes his net utility given by (3) to determine what platform to connect to.
We assume that y α > y β and proceed to compute an allocation of consumers on each platform. Note that in this case F i ( y α , ·) > F i ( y β , ·). In Section 3.2.3, we will show that if y α = y β , then any allocation of demand across platforms is possible at the resulting price equilibrium. We make the assumption that the reservation price R is large enough so that the consumer market is covered. Indeed, because of (3) for large values of R we have that θ i > (p φ(i) -R)/F i (y φ(i) , ·), implying that every consumer derives positive utility upon joining one of the platforms. We consider two disjoint cases to determine demand. If p α < p β , consumers always join the platform with the highest perceived quality since U i (φ(i) = α) > U i (φ(i) = β), which follows directly from applying Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.1. Hence, consumer demands are q α = 1 and q β = 0.
The case of
⋅ be a threshold value. Consumers with a taste parameter i θ θ ≥ join the platform with the higher perceived quality, 
Consumer Pricing Decisions
In this stage of the game platforms decide what prices p α and p β to charge consumers. The choice set of platform z∈{α, β}, given any , h is such that y α = y β then F i (y α , ·) = F i (y α , ·). Bertrand competition implies that the resulting SPE is p α = p β = 0. The consumer demands at this equilibrium price are arbitrary because any allocation such that q α +q β = f is a solution. In this case we make the standard assumption that consumers are evenly split between the platforms.
CP Connection Decisions
In this stage of the game, given the QoS y α and y β , and prices w α and w β offered by platforms and anticipating the consumer mass on each of them, CPs decide on which platform to locate. The choice set of a CP j given any k j h is ( ) { none, , }.
The utility v j extracted by a CP is given by (4) if it joins a platform or zero otherwise. Defining
,
we have that the gross revenue earned by CP j is γ j (y z q α +y β q β ) if they connect to platform z. CPs max-imizes their utility v j and are indifferent between both platforms if and only if
be the threshold, CPs with quality exceeding γ j join the high-quality platform α and those with quality below it, but larger than w β /(y β (q β +q α )), join the low-quality platform β. The rest do not join any platform. In our model, CPs participation in the market will be a proxy for CP innovation; if more CPs participate, more content is available for consumers.
Given a tuple ( , , , , ), a f y y α β γ we define the following sets which correspond to the market configurations that may arise given a CP price pair (w α , w β ). Here, the mass of CPs on each platform is written as a function of prices since the tuple ( , , , , ) a f y y α β γ is known. We denote the market configurations corresponding to sets , , , and
I I I I II IV
R R R R as C I , C II , C III and C IV , respectively. The CP market is uncovered under the first two configurations, and covered under the last two.
CP Pricing Decisions
In this stage of the game platforms decide what prices to charge CPs. The choice set of platform z∈{α, β} given any In the next subsection, we show that y α > y β = 0 at the SPE; that is, the highquality platform invests while the low-quality platform does not invest. In light of this, we now present a characterization of CP prices at equilibrium when β does not invest. We now show that for any tuple ( , , , , ) a f y y α β γ for which y α > y β = 0 there exists a unique SPE and only configurations C I and C IV can be sustained. ∈ I R Theorem 3.1 allows us to conclude that if the low-quality platform does not invest, we get a tipping equilibrium on the equilibrium path where all CPs locate on the platform with the highest quality because they make no revenue joining the lowquality platform (recall revenue is a function of platform quality). The proof of this result is constructive: We first identify candidate equilibrium price pairs in each possible market configuration (see Appendix A.2), and then check that these price equilibrium pairs are indeed Nash equilibria of the price subgame (see Appendix A.3). We do so by verifying that the equilibrium price candidates are best replies on the whole domain of strategies; that is, not only they are best responses in their respective market configurations but also best replies if the other market configurations are taken into account. For the case of y α > y β > 0, we provide a complete characterization of the CP equilibrium prices in Appendix A.3.1. Concurrently with the price characterization, we show that given a tuple ( , , , , ) a f y y α β γ any one of the market configurations, except C I , can occur at the SPE. In doing so, we determine the set of parametric values ( , , , , ) a f y y α β γ for which these different configurations exist. We believe that the characterization of equilibrium in the case y α > y β ≥ 0 is of interest in its own right and provide further interpretations in the Appendix. Finally, Lemma A.11 in Appendix A.5 shows that when y α = y β an SPE does not exist.
Quality Investment Decisions
In this stage of the game platforms simultaneously decide how much to invest in quality. The choice set of platform z∈{α, β} given any
A h y where . z y + ∈R We show that a unique SPE exists. In addition, we show that this equilibrium involves maximal differentiation subject to investment costs: one platform invests in the highest quality possible taking into account investment costs while the other chooses not to invest. Moreover, we characterize the investment levels in terms of the market parameters. We find the equilibrium quality choices by considering sets that contain the best responses for both platforms. We show that the equilibria are given by the intersection of these sets. The following theorem shows the necessary conditions for the existence of an SPE. It enables us to identify candidate equilibrium investment pairs when the mass of consumers is above a critical level. (0) The results above suggest that platforms differentiate in quality to soften price competition. If platforms are undifferentiated, they earn zero profits due to the ensuing Bertrand price competition on both sides of the market. Therefore, at equilibrium, platforms have the incentive to invest in different quality levels and achieve maximum differentiation. In the next section we discuss how the market parameters ( , , ) a f γ affect investment levels.
Investment and Market Coverage in the Neutral Case
Having analyzed all the stages of the game we now discuss the investment levels and CP market coverage at the SPE in the neutral model. On both sides of the market the platforms are viewed as substitute products by both consumers and CPs. Thus platforms make higher profits when they are more differentiated. The high-quality platform gains by investing more and the low-quality platform by investing less. For the low-quality platform the differentiation not only gives it market power on the consumer side but also reduces its investment cost. Indeed, investment by the low-quality platform increases competition on the consumer side in addition to increasing investment cost, resulting in lower consumer prices and consequently platform's profit. This reduction is larger than the additional revenues extracted from CPs this investment would generate. The investment level of the high-quality platform increases with CPs' average quality. This increases the revenues that CPs earn; recall that the advert price is increasing in platform quality. Thus, the surplus from which the high-quality platform can extract revenue also increases, enhancing investment incentives. In contrast, the relationship between the investment level and the heterogeneity is unimodal and convex. An increase in heterogeneity generally makes demand of CPs less elastic. Hence, the high-quality platform prefers to make revenue directly by raising prices rather than through investment which is more costly. However, as heterogeneity increases beyond a critical point the platform prefers to invest in quality. Due to the high prices, the CP market becomes progressively uncovered. To gain revenue from the diminishing CP base, the high-quality platform invests to increase the surplus from which it can expropriate revenue.
We next present a corollary of Theorem 3.2 that characterizes market coverage by CPs at the SPE.
Corollary 3.4 Assume that f ≥ 3/5. In the SPE, all CPs connect to the high-quality platform, and the market is covered if and only if / (3 2 ) /(9 2 ).
a f f γ≤ + + Theorem 3.2 implies that (3+2f )/(9+2f ) is the threshold that induces a covered market. When CP quality heterogeneity / a γ is high, the outcome of the game is that all CPs flock the high-quality platform without covering the entire market; that is, there is a mass of CPs that are not active in the equilibrium. This is because as CP heterogeneity increases, CP demand becomes more inelastic, and platforms have larger incentives to increase CP pricing excluding some CPs from participating in the market. Instead, for low values of / , a γ the market is covered; that is, all CPs are active and participate in the equilibrium. In this case, the demand of CPs is more elastic, and prices charged to CPs are low, encouraging high enrollment.
The Non-Neutral Model
To study the non-neutral regime we employ a model that is equal to that in the neutral regime except for one important difference: a CP that joins and pay fees, to say platform α, enjoys the "enhanced" quality level y α from that platform. However, if the CP does not directly connect to that platform, it only enjoys the basic quality level y basic ( ≤ y α ) from that provider. In this sense, there are priority lanes in our non-neutral model. For analytical tractability, we assume for now that y basic = 0; we relax this assumption later in Section 6. The limiting regime y basic = 0 (the walled-garden case) effectively implies that if a CP wants to reach the customers in one platform, it must pay that platform for that access, and if the CP wants to reach all customers, then it must pay both platforms.
As in the neutral case, each platform z charges a fixed connection fee w z . All other aspects of the model are the same as before. Platforms invest in quality, CPs earn revenue by selling advertising, and consumers connect to one of the two platforms. We solve for the SPE of this game, which we find using backward induction, and compare it to the solution of the neutral model. Without loss of generality, we continue with the assumption that y α ≥ y β ≥ 0.
The Analysis of the Non-Neutral Model
In the next subsections, we provide a more detailed analysis of each stage of the game, now for the non-neutral case.
Consumer Consumption Decisions
In the last stage of the game, consumers select CPs with whom they will connect. A consumer i on a platform φ(i) connects to a CP j only if the CP bought access to φ(i). Thus the utility gained by the consumer connecting to the CP is given by
Since this value is non-negative, all consumers will select all CPs that are accessible.
Consumer Connection Decisions
In this stage of the game consumers choose a platform to join. The quality perceived by a consumer i when he joins platform φ(i) is given by
The utility is given by demands q α and q β are derived as in Section 3.2.2, based on the prices offered by platforms and on which of the above relations holds. Note that in the nonneutral model, even though y α ≥ y β , it could be the case that relation (ii) holds depending on the values of r α and r β ; this never happens in the neutral model. This introduces additional complexity in the analysis of the non-neutral model as we discuss below.
Consumer Pricing Decisions
In this stage of the game platforms simultaneously decide what prices to charge to the consumers. Information sets in this stage can be classified into three types depending the three relations of Section 4.1.2. We characterize prices at equilibrium for each relation. When (i) holds, the resulting consumer prices are ·) ) and consumer demands are q α = 2f/3 and q β = f/3. When (ii) holds, a symmetric characterization applies. Last, when (iii) holds then p α = p β = 0. We make the standard assumption that consumers are split evenly. The analysis is similar to that in Section 3.2.3.
CP Connection Decisions
In this stage of the game CPs simultaneously decide which platforms to join. A CP j has a choice set ( ) { none, , ,both},
and makes the decision given the pair of QoS (y α , y β ) and the pair of prices (w α , w β ). We can view a CP as having an option to buy one of three possible types of connection services. Defining 
A CP j is willing to join both platforms if γ j ≥ (w α +w β )/(y α q α +y β q β ). For an exclusive connection to platform z, a CP j is willing to join it if γ j ≥ w z /(y z q z ). Given a price pair (w α , w β ), together with the tuple ( , , , , ) , a f y y α β γ we refer to the resulting CP demand on each platform as the CP allocation equilibrium. A CP allocation equilibrium also determines which of the relations in Section 4.1.2 hold on the equilibrium path. In Appendix B, we derive the sets of prices ( )
, and
R i R ii R iiii
W W W for which the CP allocation equilibrium leads to relations (i), (ii) and (iii) holding on the equilibrium path. Note that, if a price pair lies on the intersection of any of the sets
W W W then more than one CP allocation equilibrium exists. The CP demand faced by platform z∈{α, β} is given by max{min{ 1,( / ( )) /(2 ) },0 }, z zz z r aw q y a γ = +− where q z depends on which of the relations holds on the equilibrium path.
CP Pricing Decisions
In this stage of the game platforms decide what prices to charge to CPs. The multiplicity of CP allocation equilibria mentioned above makes the analysis of this stage challenging. For tractability, in the remaining sections, we focus only on price games that result when the CP allocation equilibria selected (if multiple equilibria exist in the price subgames) are such that either relation (i) or (iii) hold. We formalize this in the following assumption. Given a tuple ( , , , , , , ) a f y y w w α β α β γ for which y α ≥ y β ≥ 0 such that multiple CP allocation equilibria exist in the price subgame, we assume that only equilibria that yield relations (i) or (iii) are selected.
Assumption 1.
This assumption intuitively implies that CPs will anticipate that more consumers will join the platform with the larger investment in quality (recall that we have assumed y α ≥ y β ). In addition, our assumption is partially motivated by the fact that if an SPE exists in one of the CP price games then the CP allocation equilibrium on the equilibrium path does not yield relation (ii), see Appendix B.2. Note, however, that the assumption is still needed to analyze CP price games that are off-the-equilibrium path.
The next theorem characterizes an equilibrium for CP prices in the case of y α > y β . The proof, price characterizations and conditions for various market configurations to exist are given in Appendix B.3. There we also show that the market configuration depends only on the heterogeneity parameter a, the average CP quality γ and the consumer mass f. 
Moreover, the resulting market configuration is unique.
We show in Appendix B.4 that if an SPE in prices exists when y α = y β , the platforms have an incentive to deviate; therefore, symmetric investment levels cannot be sustained in an SPE.
Quality Investment Decisions
In this stage of the game platforms simultaneously decide how much to invest in quality. We assume that investment costs are quadratic, equal to cy 2 with c ≥ 1. We find the equilibrium quality choices by considering the best reply responses of the two platforms. We find the set that contains platform β's best replies to platform α's choices and vice versa, and establish that the best reply functions intersect at a unique point. This proves that there is a unique SPE in the investment game. As a corollary, in Section 4.2 we characterize the resulting market configurations.
To present a result that establishes and characterizes investment levels at a subgame perfect equilibrium, we define the following regions in the space defined by the Cartesian product of / , a γ the reciprocal of the heterogeneity of CP quality, and f. The partition of that space is given by: 
Investment and Market Coverage in the Non-Neutral Case
In the non-neutral regime, platforms are substitutes only on the consumer side of the market. On the CP side, CPs make decisions regarding whether to join each platform independently from the other platform. In this case, a platform has monopolistic power over CPs since its only through it that CPs can connect to its subscribed consumers. Thus investment decisions observed in this regime are driven by the trade-off platforms make between differentiating in quality to make revenue on the consumer side and exerting their monopoly power over the access to their consumer bases to extract revenue from CPs. Given the tuple ( , , ), a f γ the level of investment of the high-quality platform in the SPE is the same as that in the neutral regime and varies with the average and heterogeneity of CP quality in a similar way. Quality investment in the lowquality platform also increases with the average CP quality for the same reasons as those highlighted for the high-quality platform.
However, as the heterogeneity of CPs quality increases, investment level of the low-quality platform decreases. The decrease in investment occurs as heterogeneity increases because the platform prefers to utilize its monopoly power to extract revenue from the relatively inelastic CPs rather than by increasing investment. In addition, even though the low-quality platform can gain from increased CP surplus with a larger quality investment, (since increased platform quality increases advert revenues) the increase in competition on the consumer side would offset this gain.
We now explore the investment patterns as a function of the consumer mass and the heterogeneity in content quality, see Figure 2 . When the reciprocal of CP heterogeneity / a γ has a low value and f is high -i.e., CP heterogeneity is high and market is large, corresponding to regions 1 R and 3 R -the platforms differentiate in quality investment as much as possible to extract more consumer surplus. A low value of / a γ (high CP heterogeneity) is primarily driven by low average CP quality. Therefore the advertising revenue gained by CPs is also low and if the low-quality platform invests, the profits expropriated from CPs would not be enough to offset the investment cost plus the loss of revenue caused by the heightened intensity in competition in the consumer side. Moreover, since f is large, the mass of consumers joining the platforms is higher which further increases the revenue made from the consumer side and dissuades the platform from investing.
In contrast, when the reciprocal of CP heterogeneity / a γ has a low value but f is low (CP heterogeneity is high and market is small), the two platforms invest in quality, although not at the same level. In this region, denoted by 2 , R since f is small, by investing the platform gains more from the CP side than the revenue loses caused by competition on the consumer side. Finally, when / a γ has a medium to high value (low to medium CP heterogeneity in regions 4 R and 5 R ), the platforms partially differentiate. As in the previous case, both platforms invest at different levels. We have the following important corollary. Below, high quality CPs are such that their quality is above a threshold that depends on the model parameters. In region 1 , R CPs exclusively join the high quality platform and the market is uncovered. Observe that in this region the low-quality platform does not invest. Therefore there is no value to be gained by a CP joining the lower quality platform. Region 2 R also represents an uncovered market but CPs patronize both platforms with low-quality CPs being exclusive to the high-quality platform and high-quality CPs joining both. Observe that only the high-quality CPs connect to both platforms since they earn enough advertising revenue to cover the cost of connecting to both platforms. In the remaining regions the market is covered and all the CPs in the market serve their content through the high-quality platform. Full market coverage occurs because for medium to high values of / a γ (reflecting low CP heterogeneity); CPs are more elastic leading to low platform prices. Within these regions of full coverage, there are some distinctions. In region 3 , R the lack of investment by the low-quality platform leads to CPs not joining it since they will not make any advertising revenue. In contrast, in region 4 R the low-quality platform has CPs subscribe to it because it invests in some quality. This investment by the lowquality platform is attractive to the high-quality CPs who can command higher advertising prices that offset costs of joining the two platforms. Finally, in region 5 R all CPs patronize both platforms. The average CP quality is high enough and the variation of CP quality low enough that the advertising prices the CPs command enable them to gain more value when they connect to both than when they connect to only one platform.
Comparison of the Neutral and Non-Neutral Regimes
In this section we compare the neutral and non-neutral regimes with respect to social welfare, and surplus and profits extracted by consumers and CPs. We first define social welfare and its constituent parts. We show that CP and consumer surplus in the non-neutral model are at least equal to, if not superior than, those in the neutral model. In addition, we show a dichotomy of preferences for the two regimes by platforms. The low-quality platform prefers the non-neutral regime while the high-quality one prefers the neutral regime. Finally, we show that given a tuple ( , , ) a f γ the non-neutral regime results in at least as high social welfare than that in the neutral regime, and strictly higher for a significant range of parameters. In Section 6, we discuss how the preferences discussed here remain the same or change for the various numerical models that we analyze there. Table 1 in that section presents a summary of those preferences for all agents and for the different scenarios.
Participants' Utilities. Social welfare is defined as the sum of all the participants' utilities:
∑ ∫ in the non-neutral case.
First, we revise and compare investments and market coverage in both models.
Investments. Recall that in the SPE of the neutral model the high-quality platform invests a positive amount and the low-quality platform does not invest. In the SPE of the non-neutral model, the investment level of the highquality platform is the same as in the neutral model for all parameter values. The main difference between both models, that will drive the comparisons below, is that the low-quality platform invests a positive amount for a significant range of parameter values. Investment in the low quality regime is driven by structural implications of the non-neutral model, namely that CPs are allowed to multi-home. In fact, in the non-neutral model, platforms can recoup their investments more easily through appropriate CP pricing, due to their monopoly power on consumer's access. Consequently, the low-quality platform invests to increase revenues extracted from CPs by increasing prices; this effect is more important than softening price competition on the consumer side.
Market Coverage. Our proxy for CP innovation is CP market coverage. For all market values, CP market coverage in the SPE is the same for both models. In particular, the mass of CPs that connects through the high-quality platform is the same. The main difference between both models, however, is that in the nonneutral model and for some parameter values a mass of CPs will also connect through the low-quality platform. This happens when parameter values are such that CP average quality is high or CP heterogeneity is low. In the former, CPs earn more revenue from ad revenue and will therefore join the low quality platform. For the latter case, platform prices are low leading to higher enrollment. Note that in contrast, because the low-quality platform does not invest in the neutral model, CPs have no incentive to connect to it.
CP and Consumer Surplus Comparison.
CP surplus is at least as high in the nonneutral model compared to that in the neutral model, see Appendix C.2. Moreover, it is strictly higher in the non-neutral regime for all parameter values for which the low-quality platform makes positive investments. In particular, investments by the low-quality platform increase the advertising revenue earned by CPs that connect to it. Consumer surplus is also higher in the non-neutral regime in the cases where the low-quality platform invests in quality, see Appendix C.3. This investment increases consumer surplus for two reasons. First, an increase in the low-quality platform investment level intensifies price competition on the consumer side resulting in lower prices. Therefore, consumers are able to keep more of their surplus. Second, an increase in platform quality increases the value gained by consumers who join the low-quality platform because this enhances CP quality.
Platform Profits Comparison.
If the low-quality platform makes positive investments, profits for platforms differ in both regimes. In particular, profits of the high-quality platform are higher in the neutral regime. In this regime the platforms are maximally differentiated, and the high-quality platform serves consumers and CPs and extracts more revenue from both sides due to the resulting market power that arises from differentiation. In the non-neutral regime, the investment by the low-quality platform results in more intense price competition on the consumer side that reduces the high-quality platform's overall profits. In contrast, the low-quality platform's profits are superior in the non-neutral regime. Note that in the neutral regime, the low-quality platform makes revenue only on the consumer side, while in the non-neutral regime, it makes revenue from both sides of the market. Although the investment by the low-quality platform intensifies competition on the consumer side and reduces revenue, it enables the platform to increase the revenue from CPs which offsets losses due to this competition. Overall, aggregate profit in the neutral regime is higher than that in the non-neutral regime, because price competition is softer (see Appendix C.4).
Social Welfare Comparison.
Adding up the previous effects, we conclude that in SPE, social welfare in the non-neutral model is at least as high compared to that in the neutral model, see Appendix C.1. Moreover, social welfare in the non-neutral model is strictly higher when the low-quality platform invests. A key driver of this result is the increase of consumer surplus and CP profits in the non-neutral regime. Since the welfare difference is driven by the investment level of the lowquality platform in the non-neutral regime, the difference increases as CP heterogeneity decreases. This again reflects the effects of heterogeneity on investments in the low-quality platform (recall that as CP heterogeneity increases, investment of the low-quality platform decreases).
Numerical Experiments: Priority Lanes and Robustness
In our analysis of the models in Sections 3-5 we assumed a definition of a nonneutral network in which y basic = 0; hence, ISPs effectively charged off-network CPs to deliver their content to consumers. In this section, we consider the same basic model but we extend our analysis to the case in which platforms offer a minimum level of service y basic > 0 to all CPs, which requires them to invest in some basic quality. The main implication of the latter assumption is that now there are no walled gardens in the non-neutral regime; that is, platforms cannot prohibit access to CPs that do not connect directly to them. In this case, the non-neutral regime takes the form of priority lanes: if CPs pay fees to platform z, their CP quality is enhanced by the platform quality level, y z ≥ y basic . This model is in line with the other standard definition of a non-neutral network, perhaps more used in the policy arena. Hence, these results enrich and complement our previous analysis.
In addition, in our analysis of the models in Sections 3 and 4 we imposed various assumptions to obtain explicit analytical characterizations of equilibria, which then enabled us to compare different metrics under the neutral and nonneutral regimes in Section 5. In this section, we investigate the impact of these assumptions. Specifically, we analyze a model that eliminates additional services and congestion at the CP side of the market, and also comment on a model with congestion only, and one with additional services only.
7 These results show both the robustness of our theoretical conclusions and the effects of our assumptions.
The modifications described in the two paragraphs above prevent us from performing a mathematical treatment because we lose analytical tractability. Hence, we solve numerically for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the multistage game for the new model specifications for a broad range of model parameters. In these computations, we again take advantage of the market configuration-style analysis that we developed in the theoretical model.
An important observation from our previous discussions is the importance of CP heterogeneity on investment levels and CP prices. In the model with priority lanes, CP heterogeneity will play an even greater role as it will determine the preferences towards the neutral or non-neutral regime by the different market participants. In particular, when CP heterogeneity / a γ is low, the participants' preferences of the two-tiered model with a priority lane are all exactly the same with those of our theoretical model with walled gardens. However, when CP heterogeneity is high, there are important changes. In this case, consumers and CPs prefer the neutral regime, while the high quality platform prefers the non-neutral regime. These preferences are more in line with the current net neutrality debate in the public arena. The overall social welfare can also be higher when CP heterogeneity is high. Table 1 compactly describes the preferences of players in all different cases.
In addition, the results from the second set of experiments in which we eliminate CP congestion and additional services are, for the most part, consistent with the findings of previous sections, showing that our theoretical model is robust. However, when CPs are highly heterogeneous, we again find that CP surplus is higher in the neutral regime while the profit of the high-quality platform is higher in the non-neutral regime. We discuss these differences in more detail in the following sections.
New Models
This section provides more details on the differences between the new models and those introduced in Sections 3 and 4. As before, we assume y α ≥ y β .
A consumer i on a platform φ(i) connecting to a CP j on platform ˆ( ) j φ receives the utility specified in the following table, depending on the model choice and regime. In the first row, we present the consumer's utility function when both CP side congestion and additional services are present, exactly like in our original model (see (1)). As mentioned earlier, we also test the importance of our assumptions by removing some elements individually or collectively. For brevity, the table only presents the latter. In the neutral regime, the quality of the network transmission is given by the worst of the two platforms. Under the non-neutral regime, if ( ) ( ), i j φ φ ⊂ / the consumer i will experience the basic quality y basic if the CP is not paying fees to platform i. If CP j multi-homes by paying an access fee to both ISPs, then the quality of the network transmission is given by the quality of φ(i). Note that in the theoretical model a consumer i on a platform φ(i) could connect to a CP j only if the CP bought access to φ(i). In priority lanes, the consumer can connect to j even in this case, albeit at the basic quality level only.
CP profits under the neutral model are as in Section 3. Under the non-neutral regime, the profit v j of a CP j equals If a CP j single homes to a platform z∈{α, β}, it pays a fixed connection fee w z and makes revenue by selling advertising. Advertising revenue is composed of two parts; g(γ j , y z )q z due to access to eyeballs on platform z and g(γ j , y basic )q -z due to access to consumers on the other platform. The latter advert rate is lower because the content is only enhanced by the basic quality. This is a different formulation from our previous non-neutral model where CPs that single home got advertising revenue only from the platform they connected to because they had no access to consumers on the other platform. Now, they get access from the other platform, albeit at a lower quality of service.
A CP j who multi-homes also gains revenue from both platforms. However, the revenue from a platform z∈{α, β} is equal to g(γ j , y z )q z +g(γ j , y basic )q z . Consumers on z can view the same content in both modes, the high quality and basic quality, therefore multi-homing CPs have higher exposure on a platform and can command higher advertising revenue, unlike under the neutral regime. In addition, assuming that v j separates by platform (so
as in the previous definition) allows us to more easily solve the model numerically.
Platform payoffs are the same as in Section 3 with the only difference that now there is a constraint y z ≥ y basic , for z = α, β. The investment cost is still I(y z ).
Setup for Numerical Simulations
The models introduced in Section 6.1 are analytically intractable, forcing us to solve stages 1-2 numerically after solving stages 3-6 analytically. To find numerical solutions, we first establish CP prices: given an investment pair (y α , y β ) and parameters ( , , , ) a f c γ defining an instance of the problem, we find the best response w β to a price w α . We use here best response dynamics as a computational means to find the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game. We then use these prices in the final investment stage in which we apply the same iterative best-response algorithm. In this way, we numerically find a SPE of the game. We coded this algorithm in Matlab and for each instance we run it until convergence (modulus numerical approximation error).
We compute solutions for a broad set of model parameters that capture different market situations. We vary , γ a and f to cover all combinations of small, medium, and high average CP quality, CP-quality heterogeneity and consumer mass, respectively. We consider the following combinations: (i) average CP quality ( ) γ can be low (0.5), medium (1.5), or high (2.5); (ii) CP quality dispersion ( / ) a γ can be low (20%), medium (50%), or high (80%), which defines corresponding values for a; (iii) and the total consumer mass (f) can be low (0.8), medium (0.9), or high (1). For y basic we used the values {0, 0.5, 1}. The investment parameter c was fixed at 0.1 in all runs. In total, we solved hundreds of instances representing different combinations of the previous parameters, and combinations of model features (with or without CP side congestion and with or without additional services offered by ISPs).
Priority-Lanes Model
First, we discuss the results for the priority-lanes model. We study a model that coincides with the theoretical model (with CP-side congestion and additional services), except that y basic > 0. Market participants' preferences and welfare results between the two models are similar when dispersion of CP content is low (as measured by / a γ ) and the results follow a similar intuition as before. However, when CP heterogeneity is high, there are important changes as we now discuss. Table 2 presents a summary of the results for y basic = 0.5. In this subsection, we refer to this priority-lanes model as the numerical model. In contrast, we refer to the walled-garden model as the theoretical model.
Investments.
Similarly to the theoretical model with y basic = 0, platforms' investments are larger in the non-neutral model relative to the neutral model. This is because in the non-neutral regime if a CP wants consumers on a platform to experience quality-enhanced content they have to join that platform. (A singlehoming CP can only offer basic quality to consumers of a different platform.) A platform has therefore monopoly power over the access to consumers in as far as CPs would like to push high-quality enhanced content. Hence, platforms can more easily recoup their investments through appropriate pricing. However, we note that for large values of y basic , the low-quality platform may not have enough incentives to invest beyond y basic . As a result and as we will discuss below, the advantages of the non-neutral regime for consumers due to larger aggregate investments may decrease, reducing their relative preference for the non-neutral model.
Content Providers.
According to the theoretical model, CP coverage is identical under both regimes (with potentially some CPs additionally connecting to the low-quality platform in the non-neutral model). In the numerical experiments with y basic > 0 and when CP heterogeneity is large, the CP market coverage for the high quality platform is higher in the neutral regime, because platforms in the non-neutral regime charge higher prices to CPs than in the neutral regime taking advantage of their monopoly power (here, CP market coverage refers to the mass of CPs paying for enhanced quality).
Regarding CP preferences, we note that in agreement with the conclusions of the theoretical model, when CP heterogeneity is low, the numerical experiments provide further evidence that CP surplus is in general higher in the non-neutral regime. Indeed, under the non-neutral regime, higher aggregate investments imply that CPs earn higher revenues than in the neutral regime. Even though platforms have monopoly access over consumers, if CPs are more homogenous it is harder to differentiate between CPs and charge much higher prices than in the neutral regime. As a consequence, the higher revenue earned by CPs due to increased investments dominates the higher charges due to the platforms' monopoly power, resulting in a higher CP surplus compared to the neutral regime.
However, when CP heterogeneity is large, CP demand becomes more inelastic, so it is easier to exploit monopoly power in the non-neutral regime, and prices charged to CPs increase, also reducing CP coverage and potentially resulting in an uncovered market in the non-neutral regime. In these cases, because CP prices are higher and market coverage is lower, CPs prefer the neutral regime. These results coincide better with the publicly-held opinion by net neutrality advocates that a non-neutral network may reduce CP participation and, therefore, may reduce innovation.
The changes in CP preferences relative to the theoretical model are primarily driven by the fact that the low quality platform has a minimum level of quality that is guaranteed. Hence, CPs can enjoy ad revenues from consumers from the low quality platform even in the neutral regime. As a consequence, the advantages of larger ad revenues due to larger investments brought by the non-neutral model are reduced. Moreover, low quality CPs have basic access in the non-neutral model, and as a consequence, platforms price discriminate better (which is especially effective when CP heterogeneity is large), targeting the high-end CPs with high prices for enhanced quality. Furthermore, the minimum basic level of investment by the low quality platform increases competition on the CP side, lowering prices and increasing CP surplus in the neutral model.
Consumers.
Recall that consumers prefer the non-neutral regime in the theoretical model with y basic = 0 because of the additional investment of the low quality platform which allowed them to enjoy content in that platform. Moreover, this made the platforms less differentiated, reducing prices. In the numerical experiments, consumers also prefer the non-neutral model when CP heterogeneity is low. However, when CP heterogeneity is high, the opposite holds and consumer prefer the neutral regime. Imposing a minimum quality introduces two new effects: (1) consumers on the low quality platform are now able to derive value from CPs even if there is no additional investments; and (2) the difference between platform investments is reduced, increasing competition and lowering consumer prices. These two effects coupled with having more content available raise the value of consumer welfare in the neutral regime enough to make it favorable to consumers.
Platforms. When we analyzed the theoretical model, we found that profits for the low-quality platform are higher under the non-neutral regime. The numerical experiments provide support to that conclusion. Although the investment by the low-quality platform intensifies competition on the consumer side, the increased level of investment in the non-neutral regime and the monopoly access over its consumers allow platforms to appropriate more of the CPs' revenues.
With respect to the theoretical model, we also found that profits for the highquality platform are higher under the neutral regime. The numerical experiments are also aligned with this conclusion when CPs are relatively homogenous. This is because the maximal differentiation of the neutral regime enables the high-quality platform to earn higher revenue on the consumer side in addition to revenue earned from the CP side. In contrast to the theoretical results, however, both platforms make more profits under the non-neutral regime when CP quality is highly heterogeneous. This is because the platforms can exercise their monopoly power more effectively charging higher prices to CPs. The difference between the numerical results and the theoretical model is explained because the presence of a minimum basic quality implies that differences between platform investments are not as pronounced in the neutral model resulting in more intense price competition as already discussed.
Social Welfare. Under the theoretical model, social welfare is larger in the nonneutral model. 8 With the introduction of a minimum basic quality this observation continues to hold for low to medium values of CP heterogeneity. However, for high levels of CP heterogeneity social welfare is higher in the neutral regime. This is particularly driven by the larger CP enrollment for enhanced quality in the neutral regime relative to the non-neutral regime, increasing both gross CP surplus (through ad revenues) and consumer surplus. It is important to note that in the low CP heterogeneity environment the non-neutral regime's social welfare is larger because the effects of the higher investment levels in this regime dominate the loss of welfare caused by lower enrollment of CPs. However, as CP heterogeneity increases and the prices increase, the lower CP enrollment becomes critical creating less value for CPs and consumers compared to the neutral regime.
In summary, the welfare effects of a non-neutral network are critically determined by the trade-off between higher investments by platforms and lower enrollment by CPs. When CP heterogeneity is small, the former effect dominates and the non-neutral network is welfare superior; the opposite is true when CP heterogeneity is large.
Sensitivity to Model Assumptions
In this section we study the sensitivity of our results with respect to two features of the model: (i) CP-side congestion and (ii) platforms' provision of additional services. We solved numerically for all four combinations of models with and without these features. The numerical results show that the conclusions derived earlier are robust to these changes. For conciseness, most of our discussion below compares the model with both features, as analyzed by the theoretical model, to the model without congestion and without additional services, simply referred to as the numerical model in the rest of this section.
9 Table 3 presents a summary of the simulations for different values of y basic . We now focus on the walled-garden case where y basic = 0. At the end of the section, we briefly comment on the robustness to the same assumptions when y basic > 0.
The conclusions for investments arising from the numerical model agree with the theoretical results from earlier sections. Under the neutral regime, the highquality platform invests in high-quality while the low-quality platform invests just enough to achieve the minimum allowable quality. Under the non-neutral regime, both platforms invest to achieve a quality above the basic minimum, with the high-quality platform investing more.
According to the theoretical model, CP coverage is identical under both regimes (with potentially some CPs additionally connecting to the low-quality platform in the non-neutral model). The numerical experiments for the neutral regime indicate that there is full coverage, with all CPs connected to the highquality platform and none to the low-quality one. However, under the nonneutral regime, the market may be uncovered and CP coverage decreases as CP heterogeneity increases. Therefore, when CPs are highly heterogeneous in the numerical model, they are better off under the neutral regime. This is because as CPs become more heterogeneous, CP demand becomes more inelastic, and prices charged to CPs increase, reducing CP coverage. The difference in market coverage between the theoretical and the numerical model can be attributed to the effects of CP congestion and additional services. Under the neutral regime, platforms are viewed as substitutes by CPs, and in models without CP-side congestion, price competition for CPs under the neutral regime is more intense, reducing prices further, relative to the non-neutral model. Among the four models we considered, in those where platforms do not provide additional services, there is less value created on the consumer side forcing platforms to charge higher prices to CPs to extract more value. This effect is stronger in the non-neutral regime because of the platforms' monopoly power over access. These conclusions coincide better with the publicly-held opinion by net neutrality advocates according to whom a non-neutral network may reduce CP participation and, therefore, may reduce innovation.
According to the numerical model, consumer surplus is higher in the nonneutral regime, regardless of the heterogeneity of CPs, as it happened for the theoretical model. Let us note, however, that consumer surplus is larger in the neutral regime when CP heterogeneity is large under the model with CP-side congestion but with no additional services. This is driven by CP participation, which gets reduced in these scenarios for the non-neutral model.
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According to the theoretical model, the high-quality platform prefers the neutral regime and the low-quality platform prefers the non-neutral one, regardless of CP heterogeneity. The numerical experiments provide support to that conclusion, with the exception of the case of high CP heterogeneity, in which case the high-quality platform switches its preference to the non-neutral case. This is because the platforms can exercise their monopoly power more effectively charging higher prices to CPs that enroll and appropriating the higher revenues that CPs earn in this regime.
Regarding social welfare, the main conclusion drawn from the theoretical model is that it is larger under the non-neutral regime. The numerical experiments across the different models in general add support to this finding.
11 As discussed earlier, this fact is driven by the higher investments in the non-neutral regime, which increase the gross value gained by both CPs and consumers.
We finish this section by mentioning that in the priority-lanes case (y basic > 0, still with no congestion and no additional services), the main conclusion is that as y basic becomes larger, the basic patterns observed for y basic = 0 earlier in this section do not change for the most part, which confirms the robustness of these results.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the net neutrality debate by developing models of the Internet that explicitly incorporate competition amongst ISPs, CPs and consumers. We have looked at two versions of the model (neutral and non-neutral) that employ different contracts between CPs and ISPs to contribute to the net neutrality debate through formal economic analysis. In addition, we have provided two different formulations that capture different aspects of the definition of net neutrality (walled gardens vs. priority lanes). We have explored the effect that the different contracts have on social welfare, platform profits, and consumer and CP surplus under these formulations.
10 When there are no additional services for consumers, platforms can extract more surplus from CPs relative to consumers, and this is better exploited in the non-neutral model, further increasing CP prices. 11 One exception to this occurs for high CP heterogeneity in the model with CP-side congestion and no additional services. In this case, welfare is higher under the neutral regime because both CP and consumer surplus are higher.
One important finding that is robust under both of our formulations is that the surplus and welfare comparisons between the neutral and non-neutral networks are critically determined by the trade-off platforms face between investing in quality to increase surplus and exploiting their market power. On the one hand, in the non-neutral network platforms can more easily extract surplus using their monopoly power over consumers' access, so they have larger investment incentives. This increases consumer and CP surplus, as well as social welfare. On the other hand, due to the same monopoly power, CP prices may be larger under the non-neutral network reducing CP participation; this has a negative effect on consumer and CP surplus and social welfare. The net effect on surplus and welfare depends on which of these effects is dominant. If CP heterogeneity is small, the first effect is more important, and a non-neutral network increases welfare. If CP heterogeneity is large, in particular, in a model with priority lanes, the reverse is true.
Our results underscore several points worth considering for the net neutrality debate in the policy arena. First, contrary to qualitative arguments that are found in the literature [see, e.g., Wu and Yoo (2007) , Lee and Wu (2009) ], our results suggest that access fees (payments by off-net CPs to ISPs in order to access consumers) and priority lanes could positively impact investment incentives leading to upgrades of existing network infrastructure. Moreover in contrast to some previous results in the literature (see Section 2), we find that social welfare could be superior in the non-neutral regime across both formulations.
On the other hand, our results also suggest that a non-neutral policy could potentially reduce CP participation and innovation, reducing welfare. Therefore, if the goal is creating value and having both consumers and CPs enjoy a high welfare, it is important to establish policies that foster both investments and CP innovation. Determining the balance between these two effects is subtle and requires detailed knowledge on the form of non-neutral practices as well as on underlying economic primitives such as CP heterogeneity; these critically determine the extent of platforms market power and their ability to increase CP prices and reduce their participation.
While our results are suggestive, our model is obviously stylized so they need to be taken with caution. One simplifying feature of our analysis is the lack of transaction costs in the non-neutral regime. Incorporating them presents new analytical challenges but it constitutes an important area to explore, because they would reduce the revenue earned by the platforms and thus they are likely to temper (perhaps in a negative way) the investment incentives of ISPs. Another interesting direction to pursue is to have CP quality being determined endogenously, which would allow to compare CP incentives under both regimes. Finally, modeling congestion more explicitly would make our model more realistic. These last two extensions are likely to involve significant technical challenges. We leave these ideas and extensions for future research.
